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Oil Price Shocks, Fuel Subsidies and Macroeconomic
(In)stability in Nigeria
Babatunde S. Omotosho1,2
This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of oil price shocks and
the extant fuel subsidy regime for Nigeria. To do this, we develop and
estimate a New-Keynesian DSGE model that accounts for pass-through
effect of international oil price into the retail price of fuel. Our results
show that oil price shocks generate significant and persistent impacts on
output, accounting for about 22 percent of its variations up to the fourth
year. Under our benchmark model (i.e. with fuel subsidies), we show that
a negative oil price shock contracts aggregate GDP, boosts non-oil GDP,
increases headline inflation, and depreciates the exchange rate. However,
results generated under the model without fuel subsidies indicate that the
contractionary effect of a negative oil price shock on aggregate GDP is
moderated, headline inflation decreases, while the exchange rate
depreciates more in the short-run. Counterfactual simulations also reveal
that fuel subsidy removal leads to higher macroeconomic instabilities and
generates non-trivial implications for the response of monetary policy to
an oil price shock. Thus, this study cautions that a successful fuel subsidy
reform must necessarily encompass the deployment of well-targeted safety
nets as well as the evolution of sustainable adjustment mechanisms.
Keywords: Fuel subsidies, Oil price shocks, Oil price pass-through
JEL classification: E31, E32, E52, E62
DOI: 10.33429/Cjas.10219.1/6

1.0

Introduction

There is a large body of research investigating the macroeconomic
implications of oil price shocks as well as the role of fuel subsidies,
especially in resource-rich emerging economies (Adenikinju, 2009;
1
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Adeniyi et al., 2011; Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012; Berument et al., 2010;
Coady et al., 2017; Krane and Monaldi, 2017). The interest in this area of
research grew following the work of Hamilton (1983), which showed that
seven out of the eight post-World War II recessions were preceded by
significant oil price increases. Almost four decades after Hamilton (1983),
empirical evidence still abounds regarding the non-trivial influence of oil
price shocks on both domestic economies and the global economy at large
(Fueki et al., 2018). In order to ameliorate the welfare and macroeconomic
impacts of oil price shocks, fuel subsidy programmes have been
implemented in several countries, especially the oil-producing ones (Di
Bella et al., 2015; Estache and Leipziger, 2009).
In recent times, however, there has been an increasing call for fuel subsidy
reforms globally as policy-makers have expressed concerns regarding the
efficacy of such programmes as well as its implications for fiscal
sustainability3 (see, for example, Sdralevichet et al, 2014; Coady et al.,
2015; Ebeke and Ngouana, 2015; Jakob et al., 2015; Salehi-Isfahani et al.,
2015). It has also been argued that, contrary to its intention, badly-targeted
subsidy programmes have worsened the problem of inequality.
Consequently, a subset of the literature on oil-macroeconomy relationship
has focused on the potential impacts of fuel subsidy reforms on domestic
economies of oil-producing countries (Alleyne and Hussain, 2013; Anand
et al., 2013; Clements et al., 2013; Calvo-Gonzalez et al., 2015; Breton
and Mirzapour, 2016; Dennis, 2016). Our research falls within this strand
of the literature, taking the case of Nigeria.
Oil plays important roles in the Nigerian economy, contributing about a
third of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1980s and
1990s. Although its share of the economy has waned in the subsequent
decades due to declining oil prices and the changing structure of the
economy, the oil and gas sector still accounts for about 11.2 per cent of
the GDP in the current decade (Table 1). Also, the contribution of oil to
government revenue has remained quite high, increasing from 70.2 per
cent during the 1980s to about 80.0 per cent in the last decade. In terms of
trade, oil accounts for about 93.1 per cent of exports and 24.4 per cent of
3

Clements et al., (2013) lists the consequences of fuel subsidies to include: aggravating
fiscal imbalances, crowding-out priority public spending, and depressing private
investment, distorting resource allocation by encouraging excessive energy
consumption, and accelerating the depletion of natural resources, amongst others.
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imports during the period 2010-20184. Against this backdrop, several
studies have investigated the macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks
on the Nigerian economy. Amongst other effects, it has been shown that
oil price shocks generate significant implications for output, prices,
exchange rate, government revenues, interest rates and external reserves
(Adeniyi et al., 2011; Akinlo, 2012; Akinleye and Ekpo, 2013; Abayomi
et al., 2015; Abdulkareem and Abdulhakeem, 2016; Aigheyisi, 2018; ).
However, only a few attempts have been made at studying the role of fuel
subsides and the macroeconomic implications of its removal (Adenikinju,
2009).
Table 1: Oil and the Nigerian economy, 1980 – 2018

Share of oil
in GDP (%)
Share of oil
in govt.
revenue (%)
Share of oil
in total
exports (%)
Share of fuel
in total
imports (%)

1980-1989

1990-1999

2000-2009

2010-2018

31.23

31.99

24.07

11.21

70.19

77.11

79.85

64.77

95.14

97.35

96.97

93.05

8.39

20.12

21.30

24.41

Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin

As in many other resource-rich countries, the Nigeria government
introduced a fuel subsidy regime as part of strategies for cushioning the
macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks on the economy. Under this
arrangement, the government regulates the domestic price of fuel and pays
domestic marketers the difference between the regulated domestic price
and the Expected Open Market Price (EOMP), which is determined by the

About 91 per cent of Nigeria’s fuel requirement is imported from the rest of the world due to
poor domestic refining capacity.
4
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Petroleum Products Pricing and Regulatory Agency (PPPRA)5. It is
estimated that about N10 trillion was spent in fuel subsidy payments
during the period 2006-2018 (Budgit, 2019).
Many studies have focused on examining the implications of fuel subsidy
for the Nigerian economy. For instance, Umar and Umar (2013) and
Siddig et al. (2014) noted that Nigeria’s subsidy regime distorts fiscal
planning, encourages inefficient consumption, and increases inequality as
richer households benefit more. Siddig et al. (2014) further showed that
subsidy reduction increases the GDP and reduces household income. It
has also been shown that fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria could cause
inflation and reduce economic welfare (Adenikinju, 2009); hurt economic
growth and reduce household income (Ocheni, 2015); and make firms less
competitive (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012). These studies applied either the
computable general equilibrium model (Siddig et al., 2014; Adenikinju,
2009), analysis of survey data (Ocheni, 2015), or the narrative approach
(Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012).
In this paper, we argue that assessing the macroeconomic implications of
oil price shocks and subsidy reforms requires a good understanding of the
pass-through effects of oil price shocks to domestic fuel price 6. Thus, we
depart from previous studies by estimating the pass-through effect of oil
prices into domestic fuel price within a general equilibrium framework
prior to investigating the impacts of oil price shocks. To our knowledge,
this paper represents the first attempt at incorporating fuel subsidy into a
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for Nigeria and
estimating the pass-through effect of oil prices into domestic fuel price.
Thus, we make empirical contributions to the existing literature. Next, we
investigate the potential implications of fuel subsidy removal on the
Nigerian economy by simulating our estimated model under alternative
assumptions regarding the size of the pass-through effect. In other words,
we simulate two economies: one with fuel subsidies (i.e. incomplete pass-

5

This agency was established in 2003 to amongst others design the pricing policy
of petroleum products in Nigeria
6
While the domestic retail fuel price is administered by the federal government, the
effective price paid by economic agents often differs from one part of the country to
another. Such differences are usually amplified during periods of product scarcity as
there is lack of institutional capacity to enforce country-wide compliance by fuel
retailers. To capture this reality, we assume that part of the changes to international price
of fuel is unofficially passed to domestic consumers of fuel.
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through) and the other without fuel subsidies (i.e. complete pass-through).
Thus, the objective of this paper is to examine the impacts of oil price
shocks on Nigeria’s macroeconomy and investigate the effects of fuel
subsidy removal on key macroeconomic variables such as output,
consumption, inflation and the real effective exchange rate.
The paper is organized into five sections. In the next section, we present a
DSGE model for a resource-rich, resource-dependent emerging economy
in the fashion of Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Medina and Soto (2007)7.
Thus, the economic environments within which the model agents operate
as well as the optimality conditions guiding their decisions are described
in the section. In the third section, the estimation procedure as well the
data used for the empirical investigation are discussed. The estimation
results, including the impulse responses and variance decompositions are
presented in section four while section five concludes the paper with
policy implications.
2.0

The Model

The model we develop in this paper is an extension of Gali and Monacelli
(2005) and it incorporates: (i) an oil sector that is owned by government
and foreign investors as in Algozhina (2015); (ii) oil in household
consumption basket and firms’ production technology as in Medina and
Soto (2005) and Allegret and Benkhodja (2015); (iii) an inefficient
financial sector as in Smets and Wouters (2007); (iv) fiscal policy rule as
in Algozhina (2015); (v) a fuel pricing rule that connotes an implicit
subsidy regime as in Allegret and Benkhodja, (2015); and (vi) nonRicardian consumers to capture credit constraints8. Furthermore, we allow
for the law of one price gap in imports and by implication assume
incomplete exchange rate pass-through into import prices (Monacelli,
2005; Senbeta, 2011). Finally, we allow for nominal and real rigidities
including wage and price stickiness; consumption habits; and investment
adjustment costs. There are seven agents operating in the economy:
households, non-oil intermediate goods producers, final goods producers,
oil firm, importing firms, government, and the central bank. In what

7

Some previous applications of DSGE models to Nigerian data include Alege (2012);
Olayeni and Olabode (2013); Adebiyi and Mordi (2016); and Iklaga (2017).
8
A survey conducted in 2018 showed that about 36.8 per cent of adults in Nigeria
are financially excluded that year (EFInA, 2018).
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follows, we discuss the economic environments within which each of the
agents operates as well as the rules guiding their decisions.
2.1
Households
The economy is populated by Ricardian (R) and non-Ricardian (NR)
households. The former represents a fraction (𝛾𝑅 ) of households who have
access to the financial markets and are capable of inter-temporal
optimisation. On the other hand, the latter category, NR, are financiallyconstrained and completely consume their labour income within the
period (Gabriel et al., 2010). However, both categories share identical
preferences as the representative household j derives utility from private
consumption, 𝐶𝑡 , as well as government consumption, 𝐺𝑐,𝑡 and dis-utility
from labour, 𝑁𝑡 . Thus, they seek to maximise the expected discounted
utility function
∞

𝑈0 = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽 𝑠 [
𝑠=0

(𝐶𝑡+𝑠 (𝑗) − ∅𝑐 𝐶𝑡+𝑠−1 )1−𝜎 𝑁𝑡+𝑠 (𝑗)1+𝜑
−
1−𝜎
1+𝜑

+ ℎ(𝐺𝑐,𝑡+𝑠 )] ,

(1)

where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, 𝜎 is relative risk aversion coefficient,
and 𝜑 > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. 𝐸0
denotes the mathematical expectation operator. The utility derived by
household from government spending, h(Gc,t), is taken as given.
Household consumption is subject to external habit formation, where the
parameter ∅𝑐 ∈ (0,1) measures the degree of consumption habit.
Household consumption is a composite index comprising core (non-oil)
consumption bundle, 𝐶𝑛,𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗), and fuel (oil) consumption, 𝐶𝑂,𝑡 (𝑗).
Expenditure minimization by each household yields the optimal demand
for core and fuel consumption bundles as follows:
𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡 −𝜂𝑜
(
)
(
)
𝐶𝑛𝑜,𝑡 𝑗 = 1 − 𝛾𝑜 [
]
𝐶𝑡 (𝑗), 𝐶𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 −𝜂𝑜
= 𝛾𝑜 [
]
𝐶𝑡 (𝑗),
𝑃𝑡
where parameter 𝜂𝑂 > 0 measures the degree of substitution between core
and fuel consumption and 𝛾𝑂 represents the share of fuel consumption,
𝐶𝑂,𝑡 (𝑗) in domestic consumption. The price of fuel and core goods are
denoted as 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡 , respectively, and 𝑃𝑡 is the aggregate consumer
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price index. The domestic price of fuel, 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 is regulated based on a fuel
pricing rule that is discussed in section 2.6.
Similarly, the core consumption bundle, 𝐶𝑛𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗) combines imported
bundle, 𝐶𝑓,𝑡 (𝑗) and domestically produced goods, 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 (𝑗). Households’
expenditure minimisation subject to the composite index for the goods
yields the optimal demands for 𝐶𝑓,𝑡 (𝑗) and 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 (𝑗) as follows:
−𝜂𝐶

𝑃ℎ,𝑡
]
𝐶ℎ,𝑡 (𝑗) = (1 − 𝛾𝐶 ) [
𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡

−𝜂𝐶

𝐶𝑛𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗),

𝑃𝑓,𝑡
]
𝐶𝑓,𝑡 (𝑗) = 𝛾𝐶 [
𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡

𝐶𝑛𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗),

where 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 represents the price of domestically produced goods and 𝑃𝑓,𝑡 is
the domestic price of imported goods. The parameter 𝜂𝐶 > 0 represents
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods in the core
consumption basket while 𝛾𝐶 indicates the degree of openness of the
domestic economy. The headline consumer price index (CPI), 𝑃𝑡 , and its
core counterpart, 𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡 , are standard:
1

1−𝜂
1−𝜂
𝑃𝑡 = [(1 − 𝛾𝑂 )𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡 𝑂 + 𝛾𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 𝑂 ]1−𝜂𝑂 ,
1−𝜂𝐶

= [(1 − 𝛾𝐶 )𝑃ℎ,𝑡

+

𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡

1
1−𝜂𝐶 1−𝜂𝐶
]
𝛾𝐶 𝑃𝑓,𝑡
.

2.1.1 Ricardian households
Each household j in this category can buy and sell financial assets without
any form of constraints. Thus, the representative household makes intertemporal decisions by maximising equation (1) subject to the following
per period budget constraint
∗ ( )
𝐵𝑡+1 (𝑗) 𝜖𝑡 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑗
𝑃𝑡 𝐶𝑡𝑅 (𝑗) + 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗) +
+
∗ ∗
𝑅𝑡 𝜇𝑡
𝑅𝑡 𝜇𝑡
𝑅( )
= 𝑊𝑡 𝑁𝑡 𝑗 + 𝑅ℎ,𝑡 𝐾ℎ,𝑡 (𝑗) + 𝐵𝑡 (𝑗) + 𝜖𝑡 𝐵𝑡∗ (𝑗) + 𝐷𝑡
(2)
− 𝑇𝑋𝑡 .
where the superscript R indicates that the household is Ricardian. On the
income side of equation (2), the representative Ricardian consumer
supplies 𝑁𝑡𝑅 (𝑗) hours of work at a nominal wage rate, 𝑊𝑡 , and earns a
labour income, 𝑊𝑡 𝑁𝑡𝑅 (𝑗). It also earns capital income, 𝑅ℎ,𝑡 𝐾ℎ,𝑡 (𝑗) by
leasing an amount of non-oil capital, 𝐾ℎ,𝑡 (𝑗), to the domestic non-oil firms
at a rental rate, 𝑅ℎ,𝑡 . Each household enters the period with a stock of
nominal domestic bonds, 𝐵𝑡 (𝑗), and foreign bonds, 𝐵𝑡∗ (𝑗) maturing in
period 𝑡 + 1. The domestic bond pays a gross nominal rate of return, 𝑅𝑡
in domestic currency while its foreign counterpart pays an exchange rate
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(𝜖𝑡 ) adjusted nominal rate of return, 𝑅𝑡∗ . Following Gupta et al., (2016)
and Smets and Wouters (2007), we allow for domestic risk premium, 𝜇𝑡
over the monetary policy rate when households hold domestic assets as
well as a stochastic disturbance term that represents the risk premium
faced by households when borrowing abroad, 𝜇𝑡∗ . The foreign and
domestic risk premia are driven by AR(1) processes with independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d) innovations. The household receives an
aliquot share, Dt from the profits of the firms. The income received is used
to finance the purchase of consumption goods, 𝐶𝑡𝑅 (𝑗), and non-oil
investment goods, 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗) at their respective prices, 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 . Finally,
𝑇𝑋𝑡 represents per-capita lump-sum net taxes.
As with consumption, non-oil investment goods, 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡 , in equation (2)
comprise home-produced, 𝐼ℎ,𝑡 , and foreign-produced, 𝐼𝑓,𝑡 with their
respective optimal demands and price indices. The capital accumulation
process is given by
𝐾ℎ,𝑡+1 (𝑗) = (1 − 𝛿 ℎ )𝐾ℎ,𝑡 (𝑗)
𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗)
(3)
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗) [1 − 𝑆 (
)],
𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡−1 (𝑗)
where the parameter 0 < 𝛿 ℎ < 1 represents the capital depreciation rate.
The investment adjustment cost function is defined as:
2

𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗)
χ 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡 (𝑗)
S(
)= (
− 1) ,
𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡−1 (𝑗)
2 𝐼𝑛𝑜,𝑡−1 (𝑗)

(4)

where the parameter χ ≥ 0 governs the size of the adjustment cost. The
representative Ricardian household maximises equation (1) subject to a
per period nominal budget constraint (equation 2) and a capital
accumulation process (equation 3). The relevant first order conditions
yield the equations for consumption Euler, demand for foreign bonds,
supply of capital, and demand for investment goods.
2.1.2 Non-Ricardian households
The second category of households are non-Ricardian – i.e. creditconstrained. They are therefore incapable of inter-temporal optimisation.
Thus, the representative non-Ricardian consumer j chooses its
consumption, 𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑅 (𝑗) by maximising a utility function that is similar to
equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
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(5)

2.1.3 Labour supply and wage setting
We allow both the Ricardian and non-Ricardian households to determine
their wages à la Calvo (1983). Thus, we assume that a fraction, 1 − 𝜃𝑤 , of
households is chosen at random to optimally reset their wages each period
while the remaining fraction, 𝜃𝑤 , stick to the wages determined
previously. The optimal wage setting problem involves maximising
equation (1) subject to the household budget constraints as well as the
demand for the differentiated labour. The aggregate nominal wage rule is
standard:
1

1−𝜂
𝑊𝑡 = [𝜃𝑤 𝑊𝑡−1 𝑤 + (1 − 𝜃𝑤 )𝑊𝑡∎ (𝑗)1−𝜂𝑤 ]1−𝜂𝑤

(6)

where 𝑊𝑡∎ (𝑗) is the optimal reset wage, 𝜃𝑤 measures the degree of
nominal wage rigidity, and 𝜂𝑤 is the elasticity of substitution between
differentiated jobs. The economy-wide consumption, 𝐶𝑡 , and labour, 𝑁𝑡 ,
for the Ricardian and non-Ricardian households are aggregated as
follows:
𝐶𝑡 = 𝛾𝑅 𝐶𝑡𝑅 + (1 − 𝛾𝑅 )𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑅 ,

𝑁𝑡 = 𝛾𝑅 𝑁𝑡𝑅 + (1 − 𝛾𝑅 )𝑁𝑡𝑁𝑅 .

2.2
Open economy features
The interactions between the small open economy and the foreign
economy is discussed next. Our exposition here follows Monacelli (2005)
and Gali and Monacelli (2005). In terms of notation, we denote variables
in real terms by small letters.
Real exchange rate, terms of trade and incomplete pass-through: We
define the law of one price gap, 𝛹𝑡 , as the ratio of foreign price index
(expressed in domestic currency) to the domestic currency price of
imports:
𝜖𝑡 𝑃𝑡∗
(7)
𝛹𝑡 =
,
𝑃𝑓,𝑡
where 𝑃𝑡∗ is aggregate consumer price index of the foreign economy and
𝑃𝑓,𝑡 is the average domestic price of imported goods. It is obvious that
equation (7) takes the value of unity if the law of one price (LOP) holds.
The real exchange rate, 𝑠𝑡 , is defined as
𝜖𝑡 𝑃𝑡∗
(8)
𝑠𝑡 =
.
𝑃𝑡

10

Oil Price Shocks, Fuel Subsidies and Macroeconomic (In)stability in Nigeria
Omotosho

The law of one price gap can be re-written by making use of equation (8)
in (7) as follows:
𝑠𝑡
(9)
𝛹𝑡 =
,
𝑝𝑓,𝑡
where 𝑝𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑓,𝑡 ⁄𝑃𝑡 denotes the domestic price of imported goods in real
terms. The terms of trade, 𝜏𝑡 , is defined as the domestic currency price of
imports relative to the export price (i.e. price of domestically produced
tradable goods): 𝜏𝑡 = 𝑃𝑓,𝑡 ⁄𝑃ℎ,𝑡 .
International risk sharing: We link domestic consumption with foreign
consumption by assuming that agents in the rest of the world have access
to the same set of bonds and share the same preferences with their
domestic counterparts. This assumption allows us to derive the
international risk sharing equation by combining the Euler equations for
both the domestic and foreign economies to yield
𝐶𝑡𝑅 (𝑗)

− 𝜙𝑐 𝐶𝑡−1 =

1
𝜎 ( ∗( )
𝜚𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑡 𝑗 −

∗ )
𝜙𝑐 𝐶𝑡−1
,

(10)

where the definition of the real exchange rate in equation (8) has been
invoked and 𝜚 represents a constant that depends on the relative initial
conditions in asset holdings.
2.3
Non-oil goods producing firms
Final-good firms: These perfectly competitive firms produce final goods
∗
meant for the domestic market, 𝑌ℎ,𝑡 , and the export market, 𝑌ℎ,𝑡
, by
bundling their respective differentiated intermediate goods, 𝑌ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ) and
∗ ( )
𝑌ℎ,𝑡
𝑧ℎ . Profit maximisation subject to the firms’ bundling technology
yields a standard downward sloping demand function for intermediate
inputs meant for domestic market (𝑌ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ )) and an analogous variant for
∗ ( )
goods meant for the export market (𝑌ℎ,𝑡
𝑧ℎ ) as follows
−𝜖ℎ
∗ ( ) −𝜖ℎ
𝑃ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ )
𝑃ℎ,𝑡
𝑧𝐻
∗
∗
(11)
] 𝑌ℎ,𝑡 ,
] 𝑌ℎ,𝑡
𝑌ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ) = [
𝑌ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ) = [
∗
𝑃ℎ,𝑡
𝑃ℎ,𝑡
where 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ) is the price charged on intermediate goods, 𝑌ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ),
produced by an intermediate goods-producing firm, 𝑧ℎ . 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 is the
domestic price index and the parameter 𝜖ℎ > 1 represents the elasticity of
substitution among different intermediate goods. Also, the corresponding
price aggregators for home goods meant for the domestic market (𝑃ℎ,𝑡 )
∗
and the export market (𝑃ℎ,𝑡
) are given by:
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1
1−𝜖ℎ

1

𝑃ℎ,𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ )1−𝜖ℎ 𝑑𝑧ℎ ]

1

,

0

1
1−𝜖ℎ

∗
∗ ( )1−𝜖ℎ
𝑃ℎ,𝑡
= [∫ 𝑃ℎ,𝑡
𝑧ℎ
𝑑𝑧ℎ ]
0

∗ ( )
where 𝑃ℎ,𝑡
𝑧ℎ is the price charged on export-bound intermediate goods
∗ ( )
𝑌ℎ,𝑡 𝑧ℎ produced by an intermediate goods-producing firm, 𝑧ℎ .
Intermediate goods-producing firms: A continuum of intermediate goods
firms indexed by 𝑧ℎ ∈ (0,1), producing differentiated goods in a
monopolistically competitive environment combine three inputs: capital –
𝐾ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ), refined oil - 𝑂ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ), and labour- 𝑁𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ) using a production
technology:
𝑘

𝑜

𝑛

𝑌ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ) = 𝐴ℎ,𝑡 𝐾ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ )𝛼ℎ 𝑂ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ )𝛼ℎ 𝑁𝑡 (𝑧ℎ )𝛼ℎ ,

(12)

where 𝑌ℎ,𝑡 (𝑧ℎ ) is the output of the intermediate firm 𝑧ℎ , and the
parameters 1 > 𝛼ℎ𝑘 > 0, 1 > 𝛼ℎ𝑜 > 0 and 1 > 𝛼ℎ𝑛 > 0 are elasticities of
output with respect to capital, refined oil and labour inputs, respectively.
Total factor productivity, 𝐴ℎ,𝑡 , follows a first order autoregressive process
with i.i.d innovations. Cost minimisation subject to equation (12) yields
the firms’ optimal input combinations, while the corresponding real
marginal cost is
1
𝑟ℎ,𝑡
𝑚𝑐𝑡 =
( 𝑘)
𝐴ℎ,𝑡 𝑝ℎ,𝑡 𝛼ℎ

𝑘
𝛼ℎ

𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡
( 𝑜 )
𝛼ℎ

𝑜
𝛼ℎ

𝑛
𝛼ℎ

𝑤𝑡
( 𝑛)
𝛼ℎ

,

(13)

where 𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡 ⁄𝑃𝑡 is the real marginal cost, 𝑟ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑅𝐻,𝑡 ⁄𝑃𝑡 is the real
rental rate on capital, 𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 ⁄𝑃𝑡 is the subsidised real domestic price
of fuel, 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡 ⁄𝑃𝑡 is the real wage, and 𝑝ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 ⁄𝑃𝑡 is the real price
of domestically produced goods. Of note is the fact that the domestic price
of fuel, 𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡 , features in the real marginal cost of the firms. Thus,
administrative adjustments to 𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡 have consequential effects on firms’
marginal cost as well as their price-setting behaviour. As shown in subsection 2.6, the evolution of 𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑡 is driven by a pass-through parameter
(𝜈) that defines the extent to which changes in the international price of
oil is translated to the retail price of fuel.
Following Calvo’s (1983) staggered pricing model, each firm faces a
probability (1 – θh) of optimally resetting its price every period while the
remaining θh maintain the price as at last fixing. Profit maximisation
subject to the demands for intermediate goods (equation 11) yields the
optimal reset price for intermediate goods meant for the domestic market
as
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∎
𝑃ℎ,𝑡
=

𝑠
𝜖ℎ 𝐸𝑡 ∑∞
𝑠=0(𝛽𝜃ℎ ) 𝑃ℎ,𝑡+𝑠 𝑌ℎ,𝑡+𝑠 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑠
𝑠
𝜖ℎ − 1
𝐸𝑡 ∑∞
𝑠=0(𝛽𝜃ℎ ) 𝑌ℎ,𝑡+𝑠

(14)

∎
where 𝜃ℎ ∈ [0, 1] is an index of price stickiness and 𝑃ℎ,𝑡
represents the
optimal reset price. Analogously, the optimal price for intermediate goods
∗∎
that are meant for the export market (𝑃ℎ,𝑡
) exists with its associated Calvo
parameter denoted by 𝜃ℎ,𝑓 . The law of motion for domestic price level is:

𝑃ℎ,𝑡

1
1−𝜖ℎ 1−𝜖ℎ

1−𝜖

∎
)
= [𝜃ℎ 𝑃ℎ,𝑡−1ℎ + (1 − 𝜃ℎ )(𝑃ℎ,𝑡

]

.

(15)

2.4
Import goods retailers
We allow for incomplete exchange rate pass-through into import prices in
the short run (Medina and Soto, 2005)9. Thus, we consider a set of
competitive assemblers that produce a final foreign-produced imported
good, 𝑌𝑓,𝑡 , which is consumed by households and also used for
accumulating new capital goods. This set of competitive assemblers
combine a continuum of differentiated imported varieties, 𝑌𝑓,𝑡 (𝑧𝑓 ),
sourced from import goods retailers. As in the case of domestic
intermediate goods, the price of imported goods is determined à la Calvo
(1983). Thus, an importing firm has a probability, 𝜃𝑓 , of keeping the price
of its good fixed in the next period and a probability, 1 − 𝜃𝑓 , of optimally
resetting its price. For a firm that can reset its price, the optimal reset price
∎
(𝑃𝑓,𝑡
) is given by
𝑠

∎
𝑃𝑓,𝑡

𝜖𝑓 𝐸𝑡 ∑∞
𝑠=0(𝛽𝜃𝑓 ) 𝑃𝑓,𝑡+𝑠 𝑌𝑓,𝑡+𝑠 𝛹𝑡+𝑠
=
𝑠
𝜖𝑓 − 1
𝐸𝑡 ∑∞
𝑠=0(𝛽𝜃𝑓 ) 𝑌𝑓,𝑡+𝑠

(16)

where the definition for the law of one price gap (equation 9) has been
invoked in equation (16) and the parameter 𝜖𝑓 > 1 represents the elasticity
of substitution among different imported goods.
2.5
Oil producing firm
The oil firm operates under perfect competition, combining an extraction
technology (𝐴𝑜,𝑡 ), materials sourced from the domestic economy (𝑀𝑡 ) and
oil-related capital (𝐾𝑜,𝑡 ) to produce oil output (𝑌𝑂,𝑡 ). The produced oil is
exported to the rest of the world at a price determined in the international
crude oil market. The firm maximises its profit subject to a constant return
to scale Cobb-Douglas technology given by:
9

We achieve this by introducing local currency pricing.
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𝛼𝑘

𝛼𝑚

𝑌𝑂,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑂,𝑡 𝐾𝑂,𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑡 𝑜 ,

(17)

where the parameters 𝛼𝑜𝑘 ∈ (0, 1) and 𝛼𝑜𝑚 ∈ (0, 1) represent the
elasticities of oil output with respect to oil-related capital and material
inputs, respectively. Following Algozhina (2015), we assume that oilrelated capital, 𝐾𝑜,𝑡 is accumulated via foreign direct investment, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡∗ , as
follows: 𝐾𝑜,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿 𝑜 )𝐾𝑜,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 , where δo represents the
depreciation rate of oil-related capital. In turn, foreign direct investment
responds to international oil price as follows:
1−𝜌𝑓𝑑𝑖

∗ )𝜌𝐹𝐷𝐼
∗
(𝑃𝑜,𝑡
)
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡∗ = (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡−1

(18)

,

where 𝜌𝑓𝑑𝑖 measures the degree of smoothing in the accumulation of 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡∗
∗
and 𝑃𝑜,𝑡
is the international price of oil (in foreign currency) deflated by
∗
the foreign consumer price index. 𝑃𝑜,𝑡
and 𝐴𝑜,𝑡 are driven by AR(1)
processes with exogenous shocks as follows:
∗
∗
)
𝑃𝑜,𝑡
= (𝑃𝑜,𝑡−1

𝜌𝑜

𝑝∗

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝜀𝑡 𝑜 ) ,

𝜌𝐴𝑜

𝐴𝑜,𝑡 = (𝐴𝑜,𝑡−1 )

𝐴

𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜀𝑡 𝑜 )

Finally, we assume that the oil firm is jointly owned by foreign direct
investors and the government. Thus, it receives its profits net of royalties
levied on production quantity at a rate 𝜏 𝑜 as follows: 𝛱𝑡𝑜∗ =
∗
(1 − 𝜏 𝑜 )𝑃𝑜,𝑡
𝑌𝑜,𝑡 .
2.6
Fiscal authority
We assume the government respects a budget constraint given by
𝐵𝑡+1
(19)
𝑇𝑋𝑡 + 𝑂𝑅𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 = 𝑃𝑔,𝑡 𝐺𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑆𝑡 +
.
𝑅𝑡
Government’s revenue sources include lump-sum tax, 𝑇𝑋𝑡 ; oil revenues,
𝑂𝑅𝑡 ; and issuance of one period bonds that results in a net debt position,
𝐵𝑡 . On the expenditure side, government consumes public goods, 𝐺𝑐,𝑡 , at
a price index, 𝑃𝑔,𝑡 , and makes subsidy payments, 𝑂𝑆𝑡 . The implicit
subsidy expenditure results from an administrative decision by the
government to regulate the domestic fuel price, 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 . Since a substantial
share of fuel consumed in the domestic economy is imported, we assume
that the domestic price of imported fuel, 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 , is regulated based on a fuel
pricing rule given by10
(1−𝜈)

𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡−1 )

10

𝜈

(𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡 ) ,

This follows Allegret and Benkhodja (2015)

(20)
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where 𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡 is the landing price of imported fuel and it is given by11
∗
𝑃𝑜,𝑡
(21)
𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡 = 𝜖𝑡 𝑜 .
𝛹𝑡
∗
In equation (21), 𝑃𝑂,𝑡
is the foreign currency price of oil abroad, 𝜖𝑡 is the
nominal exchange rate and 𝛹𝑡𝑜 is the law of one price gap associated with
the import price of fuel. The evolution of 𝛹𝑡𝑜 is assumed to follow an
AR(1) process with i.i.d innovations. In equation (20), the fuel pricing
parameter 0 < 𝜈 < 1 measures the pass-through effect of oil prices into
retail fuel price and governs the level of fuel subsidies. When 𝜈 = 1, there
is full pass-through effect and the subsidy regime ceases to exist. On the
other hand, 𝜈 = 0 implies complete price regulation. Thus, our
simulations regarding fuel subsidy reforms are conducted based on
different assumptions regarding the size of the fuel pricing parameter. The
amount of fuel subsidy payment, 𝑂𝑆𝑡 , in our model is given by the
difference between the total cost of imported fuel, 𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡 𝑂𝑡 , (in domestic
currency) and the amount realised from fuel sales in the domestic
economy, 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 𝑂𝑡 . Thus,
(22)
𝑂𝑆𝑡 = (𝑃𝑙𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜,𝑡 )𝑂𝑡 ,

where 𝑂𝑡 denotes the total volume of imported fuel used up by households
and firms. In our model, government consumption represents a key
instrument of fiscal policy. Its evolution (in log-linearised form) is given
by:
𝐺
̃
̃
(23)
𝐺̃
̃𝑡 ] + 𝜀𝑡 𝑐 ,
𝑐,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑔 𝐺𝑐,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑔 )[𝜔𝑦𝑜 𝑦̃
𝑜,𝑡 − 𝜔𝑏 𝑏𝑡 + 𝜔𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑟
where 𝜌𝑔 is the fiscal policy smoothing parameter, and 𝜔𝑦𝑜 , 𝜔𝑏 and 𝜔𝑜𝑟
are government consumption feedback coefficients with respect to oil
output, domestic debt and oil revenues, respectively. The feedback
parameter with respect to oil output, 𝜔𝑦𝑜 , defines the cyclicality of
government spending. A positive value for the feedback parameter on
output (𝜔𝑦𝑜 > 0) corresponds to pro-cyclical fiscal policy while a
negative value (𝜔𝑦𝑜 < 0) indicates counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Also,
fiscal policy is acyclical when 𝜔𝑦𝑜 > 0. The feedback parameter on debt,
𝜔𝑏 is assumed negative, implying that government current consumption
declines with increased debt accumulation in the previous period.
Consistent with the behaviour of most developing oil-rich countries, we
11

This is similar to the specification in Poghosyan and Beidas-Strom (2011)
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assume that government consumption increases with increased oil
revenues. Within this set-up, debt serves as a stabilising factor in the fiscal
rule. The variables in tildes denote log deviations from their respective
steady state values. We assume that the process for government spending
𝐺

shock, 𝜀𝑡 𝑐 , is assumed i.i.d. The amount of oil revenue accruing to
government is given by:
∗
(24)
𝑂𝑅𝑡 = 𝜏 𝑜 𝜖𝑡 𝑃𝑂,𝑡
𝑌𝑂,𝑡 ,
where 𝜏 𝑜 is the royalty rate on the quantity of oil production. Since the
government budget constraint is cleared by fiscal debt, the equation for
̃𝑡 = 𝜑𝑏 ̃
lump-sum taxes, 𝑇𝑋𝑡 , is written in log-linearised form as: 𝑡𝑥
𝑏𝑡−1 +
𝜑𝑔 𝑔̃
̃𝑡 − 𝜑𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑟
̃𝑡 . The parameters 𝜑𝑏 , 𝜑𝑔 , 𝜑𝑜𝑠 and 𝜑𝑜𝑟 represent
𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑠
the responses of lump-sum tax to fiscal debt, government consumption,
fuel subsidy payments and oil revenue, respectively.
2.7
Monetary authority
In setting the short-term nominal interest rate (𝑅𝑡 ), the central bank
follows a simple Taylor by gradually responding to aggregate inflation
(𝜋𝑡 ), domestic output (𝑦ℎ,𝑡 ), and real exchange rate (𝑠𝑡 ) as follows:
𝑟
̃𝑡 = 𝜌𝑟 𝑅
̃
(25)
𝑅
̃𝑡 + 𝜔𝑦 𝑦̃
𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑟 )[𝜔𝜋 𝜋
ℎ,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑠 𝑠̃𝑡 ] + 𝜀𝑡 ,
with the variables in tildes denoting log deviations from their respective
steady state values while inflation is log-difference in aggregate consumer
price index. The interest rate smoothing parameter is denoted by 𝜌𝑟 , while
𝜔𝜋 , 𝜔𝑦 and 𝜔𝑠 are the feedback coefficients on inflation, output and real
exchange rate, respectively. The monetary policy shock, 𝜀𝑡𝑟 , is assumed to
follow an i.i.d process.
2.8

Market clearing and aggregation

Domestic non-oil output (𝑌ℎ,𝑡 ) is absorbed by domestic consumption
(comprising households - 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 , oil producing firms - Mt, and government
∗
- 𝐺ℎ,𝑡 ); non-oil exports (𝐶ℎ,𝑡
); and domestic investment (𝐼ℎ,𝑡 )12.
Consequently, the domestic resource constraint in real terms is given by:
∗
𝑌ℎ,𝑡 = 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
+ 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐼ℎ,𝑡 + 𝐺ℎ,𝑡 . On the other hand, aggregate real
gross domestic product (GDP) comprises of both oil (𝑌𝑜,𝑡 ) and non-oil
output (𝑌ℎ,𝑡 ). This is given by:

12

Which is used to augment the stock of physical capital available for use in the
production process in period t + 1
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑜,𝑡 = 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐼ℎ,𝑡 + 𝐺ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑛𝑥𝑡 .
Real net exports (𝑛𝑥𝑡 ) represents the difference between total exports
(𝑒𝑥𝑡 ) and imports (𝑖𝑚𝑡 ): 𝑛𝑥𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝑖𝑚𝑡 . The balance of payments
(BOP) equation is given by
𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑡∗
∗
∗
= 𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑡−1
+ 𝑛𝑥𝑡 − (1 − 𝜏 𝑜 )𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑂,𝑡
𝑌𝑂,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡∗ .
𝑅𝑡∗

(26)

while the labour and capital markets clear as follows:
1

𝑁𝑡 = ∫

1

𝑁𝑡𝑅 (𝑗)𝑑𝑗

0

+∫

1

𝑁𝑡𝑁𝑅 (𝑗)𝑑𝑗 ,

𝐾𝐻,𝑡 = ∫ 𝐾𝐻,𝑡 (𝑗)𝑑𝑗.

0

0

2.9
Rest of the world
∗
The demand for domestic goods by the foreign economy, 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
, is
given by:
∗

∗
𝐶ℎ,𝑡

∗ −𝜂
𝑃ℎ,𝑡
=𝛾 ∗
𝐶𝑡∗ ,
𝑃𝑡
∗

(27)

∗
where 𝑃ℎ,𝑡
is the price of domestic goods in foreign currency, 𝑃𝑡∗ is the
aggregate consumer price index in the foreign economy, and 𝐶𝑡∗ is
aggregate foreign consumption. The parameter, 𝜂 ∗ , represents the foreign
price elasticity of demand for domestic goods while the share of domestic
goods in foreign consumption is captured by 𝛾 ∗ . The IS curve for the
foreign economy is specified as:
∗ ( )
1
𝐶𝑡+1
𝑗 − 𝜙𝑐∗ 𝐶𝑡∗
[(
=
𝛽𝐸
𝑡
∗ )
𝑅𝑡∗ 𝜇𝑡∗
𝐶𝑡∗ (𝑗) − 𝜙𝑐∗ 𝐶𝑡−1

−𝜎𝑐∗

1
∗ ],
𝜋𝑡+1

(28)

where 𝜙𝑐∗ is the habit formation parameter in the foreign economy and 𝜎𝑐∗
is the relative risk aversion coefficient. The variables 𝐶𝑡∗ , 𝑅𝑡∗ and 𝜋𝑡∗
represent consumption, interest rate and inflation rate in the foreign
economy. The central bank in the foreign economy sets interest rate in a
similar fashion as the domestic economy by following a Taylor rule given
by
𝜔 ∗ 1−𝜌𝑟∗

∗

∗ )𝜌𝑟∗
∗
[(𝜋𝑡∗ )𝜔𝜋∗ (𝑌ℎ,𝑡
) 𝑦]
𝑅𝑡∗ = (𝑅𝑡−1
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜀𝑡𝑟 ),
(29)
where 𝜌𝑟 ∗ represents the interest rate smoothing parameter in the foreign
economy while 𝜔𝜋∗ and 𝜔𝑦 ∗ are the feedback coefficients with respect to

17

CBN Journal of Applied Statistics Vol. 10 No. 2 (December 2019)

inflation and output, respectively. The shock to foreign monetary policy
∗
is represented by 𝜀𝑡𝜋 . Finally, inflation rate in the foreign economy is
assumed to be given by:
∗
∗ )𝜌 𝜋 ∗
𝜋𝑡∗ = (𝜋𝑡−1
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜀𝑡𝜋 )
(30)
∗

where 𝜌𝜋∗ is the persistence parameter for foreign inflation and 𝜀𝑡𝜋 is the
corresponding shock.
3.0

Model Estimation and Data

The model is estimated via Bayesian methodology outlined in Schorfheide
(2000). To do this, we solve a system of log-linear rational expectations
equations of our model and express the solution as a vector autoregressive
representation (VAR) in 𝑧𝑡 :
(31)
𝑧𝑡 = 𝛤1 (𝛺)𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝛤2 (𝛺)𝜖𝑡 ,
where the coefficient matrices 𝛤1 (𝛺) and 𝛤2 (𝛺) are non-linear functions
of the structural parameters of our model. Next, measurement equations
are added in order to link the observable variables to the vector of state
variables, 𝑧𝑡 . The measurement equation is written as:
(32)
𝑔𝑡 = 𝐻𝑧𝑡 ,
where 𝑔𝑡 is a vector of observables that is of a lower dimension than 𝑧𝑡
and 𝐻 is a selection matrix. In our proposed model, the vector of
observable variables is
′

𝑜𝑏𝑠
∗𝑜𝑏𝑠
],
𝑔𝑡 ≡ [𝑦𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡
, 𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 𝑦𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑃𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑅𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑃𝑜,𝑡

while the remaining variables are considered unobserved. Based on
equation (28), we construct the likelihood function for the structural
parameters via Kalman Filter 13. The likelihood density is then combined
with the prior distribution of the parameters in order to obtain the posterior
density function. In the final step, the posterior distribution of the
parameters is derived numerically based on Metropolis-Hastings Monte
Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm. We then simulate 3 million
draws from the random walk Metropolis-Hastings, discarding 30 per cent
of the first draws as burn-in.

13

This is computed under the assumption of normally distributed disturbances.
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The model is fitted to the datasets on eleven macroeconomic variables
covering the period 2000Q2 - 2018Q214. These are headline Consumer
𝑜𝑏𝑠
Price Index (𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 ), core CPI (𝑃𝑛𝑜,𝑡
), nominal interest rate (𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 ), real
effective exchange rate (𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 ), real GDP per capita (𝑦𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 ), real
consumption per capita (𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 ), real investment per capita (𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑠 ), the
∗𝑜𝑏𝑠
international price of oil (𝑃𝑜,𝑡
) deflated by foreign price index, tradeweighted foreign real GDP per capita (𝑦𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠 ), trade-weighted foreign
aggregate CPI (𝑃𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠 ), and trade-weighted foreign interest rate (𝑅𝑡∗𝑜𝑏𝑠 ).
The foreign variables are weighted based on Nigeria’s trade with her
major trading partners: the Euro area, the United States, and India 15.
Dataset on the domestic variables are sourced from the National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) statistics
database. In order to derive per capita values for relevant domestic
variables, we used the annual population figures to interpolate for the
quarters. The data set for foreign variables as well as the international
∗𝑜𝑏𝑠
price of oil (𝑃𝑜,𝑡
) are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis database (FRED) and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With the exception of interest
rates, we transform the observables to their model consistent forms by
taking their log-differences. The interest rates are, however, expressed in
quarterly terms.
3.1
Model parameters
3.1.1 Parametrization
Table 2 presents a list of calibrated parameters and their values. These
parameters are derived from relevant sources, including typical values
assumed for small open economies as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and
resource-rich emerging economies such as Romero (2008), Ferrero and
Seneca (2019), Iklaga (2017), and Omotosho (2019).
We set the discount factor, 𝛽, equal to 0.99 (Allegret and Benkhodja,
2015; Iklaga, 2017); the depreciation rate, 𝛿 ℎ , equal to 0.025 (Algozhina,
2015; Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015; Iklaga, 2017); share of imports in
household’s consumption, 𝛾𝐶 , equal to 0.4 (Gali and Monacelli, 2005);
14

The choice of the estimation sample is largely influenced by data availability for the
domestic economy.
15
These three regions account for about 65 per cent of Nigeria’s total external trade over
the last two decades. The normalised trade weights are: the Euro area (0.39), United
States (0.36), and India (0.25), respectively.
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share of imports in household’s investment, 𝛾𝐼 , equal to 0.2; elasticity of
domestic output with respect to capital, 𝛼ℎ𝑘 , equal to 0.33 (Algozhina,
2015; Rasaki and Malikane, 2015); elasticity of domestic output with
respect to labour, 𝛼ℎ𝑛 , equal to 0.55 (Ncube and Balma, 2017); elasticity
of oil output with respect to capital, 𝛼𝑜𝑘 , equal to 0.7 (Algozhina, 2015);
elasticity of oil output with respect to materials, 𝛼𝑜𝑚 , equal to 0.3
(Algozhina, 2015; Ferrero and Seneca, 2019). Most of the parameters
relating to fiscal policy and the fuel pricing rule are based on Algozhina
(2015).
Table 2: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Definition
Discount factor
Depreciation rate
Share of imports in household's consumption
Share of fuel in household's consumption
Share of imports in household's investment
Relative initial conditions in asset holdings
Calvo - wages
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to capital
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to oil
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to labour
Elasticity of oil output with respect to capital
Elasticity of oil output with respect to materials
Share of imports in government's consumption
Elasticity of sub. between foreign & domestic goods - Govt
Response of public consumption to fiscal debt
Response of public consumption to oil revenue
Response of lump-sum taxes to fiscal debt
Response of lump-sum taxes to government consumption
Response of lump-sum taxes to fuel subsidy payments
Response of lump-sum taxes to oil revenue
Habit formation parameter in foreign economy
Intra-temporal elasticity in foreign demand
Relative risk aversion coefficient in the foreign economy
Coefficient of inflation in Taylor Rule - foreign economy
Coefficient of output in Taylor Rule - foreign economy
Implied steady state ratios
Consumption - output
Investment - output
Domestic materials - output
Government consumption - output
Export - output
Import - output

Symbol
𝛽
𝛿ℎ = 𝛿𝑜
𝛾𝑐
𝛾𝑜
𝛾𝑖
𝜚
𝜃𝑤
𝛼ℎ𝑘
𝛼ℎ𝑜
𝛼ℎ𝑛
𝛼𝑜𝑘
𝛼𝑜𝑚
𝛾𝑔
𝜂𝑔
𝜔𝑏
𝜔𝑜𝑟
𝜑𝑏
𝜑𝑔
𝜑𝑜𝑠
𝜑𝑜𝑟
𝜙𝑐∗
𝜂∗
𝜎𝑐∗
𝜔𝜋 ∗
𝜔𝑦 ∗

Value
0.990
0.025
0.400
0.085
0.200
1.000
0.750
0.330
0.120
0.550
0.700
0.300
0.120
0.600
0.300
0.800
0.400
0.950
0.100
0.300
0.000
0.790
1.000
1.500
0.500

𝐶ℎ ⁄𝑌ℎ
𝐼𝑛𝑜 ⁄𝑌ℎ
𝑀 ⁄𝑌ℎ
𝐺𝑐 ⁄𝑌ℎ
𝐶ℎ∗ ⁄𝑌ℎ
𝐼𝑀 ⁄𝑌ℎ

0.690
0.150
0.010
0.070
0.070
0.150

3.1.2 Prior moments
Our assumptions regarding the prior distributions of the estimated
parameters are presented in Table 3. The priors for the domestic economy
are chosen based on calibration, the data and partly on Iklaga (2017). On
the other hand, the foreign priors are based on Smets and Wouters (2007).
In cases where we have limited information to form a credible prior, we
impose less informative priors, allowing the data to determine the location
of the parameter. As in Smets and Wouters (2007), we set the
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autoregressive coefficients for the exogenous disturbances uniformly to
follow beta distributions centered at 0.5. However, we assume larger
standard deviations of 0.25 in order to reflect our level of uncertainty
about the assumed parameter values. In terms of the parameters of the
shock processes, we assume an inverse gamma distribution with a mean
of 0.10 and a standard deviation of 4.0, which is much higher than 2.0 in
Smets and Wouters (2007).
We assume that the proportion of Ricardian consumers (𝛾𝑅 ) is represented
by a beta distribution with a mean of 0.6 and standard deviation of 0.10
(Iklaga, 2017; Ncube and Balma, 2017). The labour supply elasticity (𝜑)
is set to 1.45 in line with Algozhina (2015) and assumed to follow a
gamma distribution with a standard deviation of 0.1. The risk aversion
parameter, 𝜎, is represented by an inverse gamma distribution with a mean
of 2.0 (Iklaga, 2017). The external habit parameter (∅𝑐 ) is represented by
a beta distribution with a mean of 0.7 and standard deviation of 0.1
(Iklaga, 2017) while the investment adjustment cost parameter (χ) is
represented by a gamma distribution with mean 4.0 and a relatively large
standard deviation of 3.0 (Iklaga, 2017; Ncube and Balma, 2017).
The reaction coefficients in the monetary policy function are assumed to
follow gamma distributions with the coefficient for inflation (𝜔𝜋 ) centered
at 1.5 while the coefficients for output (𝜔𝑦 ) and exchange rate (𝜔𝑠 ) are
each set to 0.125 (Adebiyi and Mordi, 2016; Iklaga, 2017; Smets and
Wouters, 2007). The fuel pricing parameter, 𝜈, is set to follow a beta
distribution with a mean of 0.3 in line with Allegret and Benkhodja
(2015). At 𝜈 = 0.3, we assume a pass-through effect of 30 per cent from
international oil prices into retail fuel price.
4.0

Results

In this section, we present the posterior distributions of the estimated
parameters and analyse the effects of oil price shocks on the Nigerian
economy. We also show the results of our counterfactual simulations
regarding the responses of the economy to an oil price shock under
alternative assumptions regarding the pass-through effects of oil prices
into domestic price of fuel.
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4.1
Posterior estimates
Table 3 reports the posterior moments for the estimated structural, policy
and shock parameters. The parameters in the utility function are estimated
to be lower than their priors. For instance, at 𝜎 = 1.4, the estimated
relative risk aversion parameter is lower than 2.0 initially assumed but
slightly higher than 1.38 estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007) for the
US economy. This implies that the savings/investment behaviour of
households are more sensitive to structural shocks in Nigeria.
Table 3: Priors and posterior estimates
Prior distribution
Parameter
Mean
0.60
1.45
2.00
0.70
4.00
0.30
0.20
0.60
0.60
0.70
0.70

0.10
0.10
0.40
0.10
3.00
0.10
0.10
0.20
0.20
0.10
0.10

0.692
1.439
1.409
0.438
6.181
0.429
0.188
0.609
0.615
0.719
0.691

0.562
1.274
1.109
0.310
1.751
0.190
0.044
0.287
0.286
0.620
0.525

1.500
0.125
0.125
0.500
0.400
0.500

0.20
0.05
0.05
0.25
0.50
0.25

2.857
0.118
0.109
0.224
0.351
0.487

2.579 - 3.141
0.043 - 0.191
0.040 - 0.176
0.054 - 0.382
-0.47 - 1.184
0.073 - 0.896

Beta
Beta
Beta
Beta
Beta
Beta
Beta
Beta

0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.5

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25

0.771
0.502
0.786
0.608
0.923
0.859
0.138
0.442

0.593
0.100
0.703
0.250
0.827
0.790
0.001
0.303

- 0.957
- 0.905
- 0.871
- 0.957
- 0.987
- 0.929
- 0.257
- 0.584

Inv. Gamma
Inv. Gamma
Inv. Gamma
Inv. Gamma

0.1

4
4
4
4

0.246
0.076
0.162
0.098

0.105
0.024
0.132
0.023

- 0.407
- 0.133
- 0.192
- 0.177

Inv. Gamma
Inv. Gamma

0.1
0.1

4
4

0.904
0.379

0.444 - 1.490
0.300 - 0.455

Density
Structural parameters
Ricardian consumers: 𝛾𝑅
Labour supply elasticity: 𝜑
Relative risk aversion: 𝜎
External habit: 𝜙𝑐
Investment adj. cost: 𝜒
Fuel pricing parameter: 𝜈
Oil - core cons. elasticity: 𝜂𝑜
For. - dom. cons. elasticity: 𝜂𝑐
For. - dom. inv. elasticity: 𝜂𝑖
Calvo - domestic goods: 𝜃ℎ
Calvo - imported goods: 𝜃𝑓
Policy parameters
Taylor rule - inflation: 𝜔𝜋
Taylor rule - output: 𝜔𝑦
Taylor rule - exch. rate:𝜔𝑠
Interest rate smoothing: 𝜌𝑟
Fiscal policy cyclicality: 𝜔𝑦𝑜
Fiscal policy persistence: 𝜌𝑔
Persistence of shocks
Dom. productivity: 𝜌𝑎 ℎ
Oil productivity: 𝜌𝑎 0
Dom. risk premium: 𝜌𝜇
Law of one price gap-oil: 𝜌𝜓 𝑜
Int'l oil price shock: 𝜌𝑝 𝑜
For. risk premium: 𝜌𝜇 ∗
For. inflation: 𝜌𝜋 ∗
For. monetary policy: 𝜌𝑟 ∗
Standard deviation of shocks
𝑎
Dom. productivity: 𝜀𝑡 ℎ
𝑎𝑜
Oil productivity:𝜀𝑡
𝜇
Dom. risk premium: 𝜀𝑡
𝑔𝑐
Dom. fiscal policy:𝜀𝑡
𝜓𝑜

Law of one price gap-oil: 𝜀𝑡
Dom. monetary policy: 𝜀𝑡𝑟

Posterior distribution
Std.
Dev.

Beta
Gamma
Inv. Gamma
Beta
Gamma
Beta
Gamma
Gamma
Gamma
Beta
Beta
Gamma
Gamma
Gamma
Beta
Normal
Beta

0.1
0.1
0.1

Mean

90% HPD Int.
- 0.824
- 1.600
- 1.694
- 0.568
- 10.490
- 0.640
- 0.328
- 0.926
- 0.933
- 0.826
- 0.860

The estimated labour supply elasticity (𝜑 = 1.44) is about the same value
as its assumed prior of 1.45 while the estimated external habit parameter
(∅𝑐 ) is 0.4, which is lower than the assumed prior of 0.7. The posterior
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mean for the share of Ricardian consumers (𝛾𝑅 ) is 0.69. This is higher
than the estimate of 0.62 obtained by Iklaga (2017) for the period 20032015. The estimated Taylor rule indicates that the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) has been quite hawkish while also keeping an eye on output and
the exchange rate. The CBN’s reaction coefficient on inflation (𝜔𝜋 ) is
estimated at 2.86, which is substantially higher than the prior (1.50), the
1.45 obtained by Iklaga (2017) and 1.405 estimated for an oil-importing
economy of South Africa by Hollander et al. (2018). At 𝜔𝑦 = 0.12, output
considerations carry a higher weight in the Taylor rule than exchange rate
(𝜔𝑠 = 0.11). The estimated interest rate smoothing parameter is low
(𝜌𝑟 = 0.22), but comparable to the value of 0.21 obtained by Olayeni and
Olabode (2013) for Nigeria over the period 1986-2004 and 0.26 obtained
by Medina and Soto (2005) for the Chilean economy. The observed policy
behaviour of the CBN is consistent with the findings of Olayeni and
Olabode (2013) and Adebiyi and Mordi (2016).
In terms of fiscal policy, our results provide evidence of pro-cyclical fiscal
policy as the feedback parameter with respect to oil output (𝜔𝑦𝑜 ) in the
government spending rule is estimated at 0.35. Also, the fiscal policy
persistence parameter is estimated at 0.49, which is slightly lower than the
assumed prior of 0.5.
Turning to the fuel pricing rule, which governs the dynamics of the fuel
consumption subsidy regime, our results show that the government bears
more than half of the effects of international oil prices on domestic fuel
price under its subsidy programme. The estimated pass-through parameter
(𝜈) is 0.43, which is higher than the value of 0.30 initially assumed. This
implies an incomplete pass-through of international oil prices into
domestic fuel price, as expected of an economy with a fuel subsidy
programme. This effort appears to be the first attempt at estimating this
parameter for Nigeria. As earlier explained, our counterfactual
simulations shown in sub-section 4.3 are based on alternative assumptions
regarding the pass-through parameter in the domestic fuel pricing rule.
Our benchmark simulation corresponds to the estimated value of the passthrough parameter (𝜈 = 0.43) while the alternative scenario is based on a
value of unity, implying complete pass-through of oil price shocks into
retail fuel price.
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4.2
How important are oil price shocks?
4.2.1 Historical decomposition
In this sub-section, we analyse the historical decompositions of aggregate
GDP, headline inflation, core inflation, real exchange rate and the interest
rate over the sample period. For ease of presentation and analysis, we
group the shocks under five categories: (i) oil shocks (comprising oil
sector productivity, international oil price, and the law of one price gap
for fuel); (ii) external shocks (comprising foreign inflation, foreign
interest rate and external risk premium); (iii) domestic supply shocks
(comprising domestic productivity and domestic risk premium); (iv)
monetary policy shock; and (v) fiscal policy shock.

Figure 1: Historical decomposition of output
Figure 1 presents the historical decomposition of the five groups of shocks
to the growth of aggregate GDP during the period 2000Q2-2018Q2. The
improved output performances in the second half of years 2001 and 2005
were driven largely by positive oil shocks, a dovish monetary policy
stance, and positive domestic supply shocks. We also observe that the
second half of the last decade (2005 - 2010) was associated with relative
stability in output growth with monetary policy shocks, domestic supply
shocks and oil shocks playing significant roles. However, the poor output
performance recorded in the third quarter of 2011 can be explained by
negative domestic supply shocks as well as the hawkish stance of
monetary policy in response to the inflationary pressures that resulted
from the impacts of the 2008/09 global financial crisis. It is also clear from
Figure 1 that negative oil and domestic supply shocks were the
predominant sources of the negative output growth recorded in 2016.
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Figure 2 presents the historical decomposition of aggregate inflation. Oil
shocks played prominent roles in the last decade (2000-2010) while
monetary and domestic supply shocks are more relevant in the current
decade. The observed inflationary pressures during the mid-2000s were
driven by negative domestic supply shocks. Also, the increasing
inflationary trend experienced during the second half of 2015 are
attributable to negative domestic supply and monetary policy shocks.

Figure 2: Historical decomposition of headline inflation
Figure 3 shows that oil shocks as well as monetary policy innovations
played non-trivial roles in the evolution of real exchange rate during the
sample period. Prior to the 2008/09 global financial crisis, the exchange
rate exhibited high volatility, which is mainly attributable to oil shocks
and domestic supply shocks (i.e. total factor productivity). The sharp
depreciation recorded during the global financial crisis was subsequently
met with higher oil prices and monetary policy tightening by the Central
Bank of Nigeria. Thus, a combination of favourable oil prices and positive
monetary policy innovations explained the appreciation of the exchange
rate between 2009 and 2010. Subsequently, the exchange rate remained
relatively stable till the first half of 2015 when a sharp depreciation was
again recorded, owing to oil shocks, domestic supply innovations and
external shocks.
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Figure 3: Historical decomposition of real exchange rate
The massive depreciation in the exchange rate in the period 2015-17 is
principally explained by domestic supply shocks and oil-related
disturbances. During this period, the oil price crashed from about
US$102/barrel in the third quarter of 2014 to about US$50/barrel in the
second quarter of 2017. This sort of significant crash generates non-trivial
effects on general economic activities of a resource-rich, resourcedependent country, such as Nigeria. The massive reduction in oil earnings
during 2015-17 led to scarcity of foreign exchange, which led to a rapid
depletion in Nigeria’s stock of external reserves. Faced with a near
currency crisis situation, the CBN devalued the domestic currency (Naira)
and restricted selected importers’ access to the official foreign exchange
supply. Consequently, domestic producers were unable to effectively
source for foreign exchange to meet their import needs for raw materials
and machineries, causing a negative shock to domestic factor productivity.
The massive depreciation was then followed by a correction in the
exchange rate and some stability in the foreign exchange market, owing
to a rebound in the price of crude oil in the third quarter of 2017 as well
as a hawkish monetary policy stance of the CBN during the period.
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Figure 4: Historical decomposition of interest rate
Finally, the historical decomposition of interest rate over the sample
period is shown in Figure 4. Similar to the findings of Hollander et al.
(2018) for the South-African economy, our results indicate that monetary
policy and domestic supply (largely risk premium) shocks play non-trivial
roles in the evolution of the nominal interest rate in Nigeria. Also, external
shocks (i.e. foreign inflation and external risk premium shocks) play
relatively significant roles in explaining the hawkish monetary policy
stance of the CBN during the period of the global financial crisis.
4.2.2 Forecast error variance decomposition
In Table 4, we present the forecast error variance decompositions of
aggregate output and the headline inflation over four different time
horizons. We have maintained the grouping of the shocks as in sub-section
4.2.1.
Table 4 shows that domestic supply shocks contribute about 46.4 per cent
to variations in aggregate output within the first year (4 quarters). It is
clear from the results that the effects of domestic supply shocks on output
are quite persistent; it contributed up to 56.42 per cent to its variations by
the fourth year. In the short run, monetary policy constitutes the second
most dominant shock, accounting for 29.5 per cent of output variations.
Also, about a fifth of total variations in GDP is caused by oil shocks over
the one-to-four year horizons. By the third and fourth years, oil shocks
constitute the second most dominant shock driving the variations in
aggregate GDP.
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Table 4: Forecast error variance decomposition of selected variables
8
12
Shock
4 quarters quarters
quarters
Variance decomposition of aggregate GDP (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks
46.43
55.80
56.76
External shocks
2.42
1.95
1.84
Oil shocks
21.73
20.04
20.65
Monetary policy shocks
29.46
21.95
20.50
Fiscal policy shocks
0.33
0.25
0.25
Variance decomposition of headline inflation (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks
31.54
34.50
35.07
External shocks
26.39
25.22
24.98
Oil shocks
1.60
1.79
1.86
Monetary policy shocks
40.46
38.48
38.09
Fiscal policy shocks
0.00
0.00
0.00
Variance decomposition of real exchange rate (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks
48.23
51.54
51.19
External shocks
16.56
15.41
15.13
Oil shocks
17.30
17.91
19.11
Monetary policy shocks
17.76
15.04
14.48
Fiscal policy shocks
0.14
0.08
0.09
Variance decomposition of interest rate (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks
59.87
63.48
64.11
External shocks
32.37
29.26
28.72
Oil shocks
1.55
1.65
1.67
Monetary policy shocks
6.21
5.60
5.49
Fiscal policy shocks
0.00
0.00
0.00

16
quarters
56.42
1.81
21.58
19.95
0.24
35.16
24.92
1.94
37.97
0.00
50.90
14.86
19.96
14.20
0.09
64.21
28.60
1.70
5.47
0.01

Headline inflation is largely driven by monetary policy shocks,
confirming the efficacy of monetary policy in curbing inflationary
tendencies in the country. The second most important shocks relate to
domestic supply as they account for about a third of total variations in
headline inflation across the different time horizons considered. As
expected of a small open economy developed in this paper, external
shocks account for about 26.4 per cent variations in the short-run and up
to about 24.9 per cent by the fourth year. Expectedly, the contribution of
oil price shocks to headline inflation is quite miniscule, perhaps owing to
the incomplete pass-through of international oil prices into domestic fuel
price.
Our results show that domestic supply shocks (total factor productivity
and domestic risk premium) account for about 50.9 per cent of the total
variation in real exchange rate over the 1-4 year horizon. However, in the
first year, external shocks (foreign inflation, foreign interest rate and
external risk premium shocks) and monetary policy innovations jointly
explain about 34.32 per cent of its variation. Also, oil shocks account for
a relatively substantial part of total variations in exchange rate over the
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horizons considered, ranging from 17.3 per cent in the first year to about
20.0 per cent up to the fourth year. By the fourth year, oil price shock is
the second largest category of shock explaining the variations in exchange
rate, after domestic shocks. Furthermore, our results show that domestic
supply and external shocks are the key drivers of nominal interest rates,
jointly accounting for over 90.0 per cent of the forecast variance across all
the horizons considered. However, fiscal policy and oil price shocks
contribute in a relatively negligible way.
4.3
Oil price shocks, fuel subsidy and the economy
4.3.1 Response of the economy to a negative oil price shock
Figure 5 shows the estimated impulse responses of selected model
variables to a one standard deviation (one-SD) negative international oil
price shock. Following a decline in oil prices, the oil firms become less
profitable, leading to a decline in their output and a reduction in the oil
firms’ demand for materials sourced from the domestic economy (as
implied by equation 17). In view of the size of the oil sector as well as the
impacts of oil price declines on government consumption, aggregate GDP
falls and the effect is quite persistent. However, private consumption rises
as more income becomes available to households following a negative oil
price shock– oil constitutes part of the consumption basket of the
household in our model, implying that a decline in oil price releases more
resources to households to spend. A negative oil price shock causes the
non-oil sector to become relatively more attractive as more productive
resources are directed from the oil to the non-oil sector. The inflow of
productive resources into the non-oil sector as well as the increased private
consumption and reduced marginal cost lead to an increased in non-oil
GDP. However, the increase in non-oil output is suppressed initially due
to the reduced demand for non-oil goods by the oil sector.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a one-SD negative oil price shock
Since the price of fuel features in the real marginal cost equation of
domestic firms (equation 13), a negative oil price shock generates lower
marginal cost and leads to a fall in domestic inflation. However, the
instrumentality of exchange rate pass-through causes import prices to rise
following a depreciated exchange rate. The combined effects of a negative
oil price shock on the prices of domestic and imported goods causes core
inflation to increase. Thus, the increases in headline and core measures of
inflation are induced by the depreciation in exchange rate. The monetary
authority responds to the initial exchange rate-induced rise in headline
inflation by embarking on an interest rate hike, a move that further
exacerbates the contractionary effects of the negative oil price shock on
the aggregate GDP. In a nutshell, a negative international oil price shock
generates aggregate GDP contraction, increase in non-oil GDP, reduction
in domestic inflation, exchange rate depreciation, increases in headline
and core measures of inflation, and an interest rate hike in our small open
resource-rich economy.
4.3.2 Macroeconomic implications of fuel subsidy removal
In this sub-section, we simulate two economies based on different
assumptions regarding the size of the pass-through effect of oil prices into
the retail price of fuel. The first economy is based on a benchmark model
under which the fuel pricing parameter is set at 𝜈 = 0.43. The second
economy is based on an alternative model simulated under an assumption
of complete pass-through effect, such that 𝜈 = 1 (i.e. a no subsidy
regime). The responses of the economy a decline in oil price (equivalent
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to a one-SD negative real oil price shock) under these two alternative
economies are presented in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Impulse responses under different assumptions regarding fuel
subsidies
Following a one-SD negative real oil price shock, aggregate GDP in the
domestic economy contracts. However, the contraction under a model
with fuel subsidies (𝜈=0.43) is more severe in the short run. In other
words, fuel subsidy removal ameliorates the contractionary effects of a
negative oil price shock in our small open economy. Non-oil GDP
increases in the aftermath of a negative oil price shock due to the
associated lower real marginal cost faced by the firms as well as the
increased aggregate demand arising from additional income that is
available to consumers. Thus, private consumption rises. Similar to the
case under aggregate GDP, better outcomes are recorded for non-oil GDP
and private consumption under a model without fuel subsidies (𝜈=1) in
line with the findings of Siddig et al. (2014). That is, the increases in nonoil output and private consumption associated with a negative oil price
shock are higher under an economy without fuel subsidies, compared to
the case for an economy with a fuel subsidy regime.
Given a negative oil price shock, Figure 6 shows that domestic inflation
declines more under a model without fuel subsidies (𝜈=1), owing to the
complete pass-through effect of international oil prices into the retail price
of fuel. Thus, the effects of the negative oil price shock are fully reflected
in firms’ real marginal cost, leading to a downward adjustment in the
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prices of domestically produced goods. In other words, the fuel subsidy
regime adds additional stickiness to the evolution of domestic prices,
which causes domestic inflation to be rigid downwards. The behaviours
of imported and core measures of inflation are quite similar in both
qualitative and quantitative terms. However, the immediate impact of a
negative oil price shock on headline inflation differs under the two
models. Upon impact, headline inflation declines under the benchmark
model following a negative shock to oil price while the decline is delayed
under the alternative model. The delayed response of headline inflation
under the alternative model can be explained by the price rigidity implied
by the fuel subsidy programme. Though the real exchange rate depreciates
more under the model without fuel subsidies, the inflationary impacts of
such depreciation on headline inflation is more than offset by the reduction
in domestic inflation under such a regime (𝑖. 𝑒. 𝜈=1). On the other hand,
the inflationary effects of exchange rate depreciation cause headline
inflation to rise under the economy with fuel subsidies (𝜈=0.43) since
domestic inflation is sticky downwards.
Consequently, the monetary authority of an economy with a fuel subsidy
regime increases interest rate following a negative oil price shock, a move
that pushes the economy further into recession (Figure 6). On the other
hand, the monetary authority of an economy without a fuel subsidy regime
faces no inflation threats following a negative oil price. It, therefore, cuts
rates in the bid to boost aggregate demand and increase domestic output.
Of course, such a move causes an immediate exchange rate overshooting
as against the case under the benchmark model where a delayed
overshooting is observed (Figure 6). These results are useful in helping to
understand the issues relating to the macroeconomic implications of
potential fuel subsidy reforms in Nigeria.
In order to investigate the level of macroeconomic instabilities associated
with fuel subsidy removal, we report the variances of selected
macroeconomic variables under the benchmark and alternative models in
Table 5. It can be seen from the table that, given an oil price shock, the
alternative model is associated with slightly higher volatility in aggregate
GDP, headline inflation, core inflation, domestic inflation, real exchange
rate, and the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, non-oil GDP, private
consumption, and imported inflation are insignificantly less volatile under
a no subsidy regime.
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Table 5: Variances of selected macroeconomic variables under different
assumptions regarding fuel subsidies
Variable
Aggregate GDP
Non-oil GDP
Private consumption
Headline inflation
Core inflation
Domestic inflation
Imported inflation
Real exchange rate
Interest rate

Benchmark (subsidy)
0.1769
0.0281
0.1060
0.0033
0.0055
0.0032
0.0058
0.3208
0.0076

Alternative (no Subsidy)
0.1841
0.0245
0.1016
0.0038
0.0076
0.0046
0.0053
0.3307
0.0089

Overall, the results of our counterfactual simulations indicate that the
extant fuel subsidy regime in the country has non-trivial implications for
the economy’s response to an oil price shock. In view of the
macroeconomic instabilities observed under the alternative model, this
paper cautions that potential future subsidy reforms must be conducted
with due diligence. While the fiscal sustainability implications of the fuel
subsidy programme remain a source of concern to policy makers, this
paper calls for a more expansive study to assess such implications and
evaluate the welfare impacts of potential subsidy reforms.
5.0

Conclusion and Policy Implications

The debates around the macroeconomic implications of oil price shocks
as well as the relevance of the extant fuel subsidy regime in Nigeria has
remained intense over the years. At the global level, international
organisations and policy makers have raised concerns regarding how welltargeted energy subsidies have been, especially with regards to protecting
the poor segment of the society. Those who believe that energy subsidies
have outlived their usefulness have called for its abolition in order to free
up fiscal resources for economic development. In Nigeria, while the fuel
subsidy debate continues to gather steam, studies addressing the welfare
and macroeconomic implications of its removal are still relatively scanty.
Results from our estimated DSGE model show that the pass-through effect
of international oil prices into domestic fuel price is about 43 per cent. We
indicate that the size of the pass-through parameter governs the dynamics
of fuel subsidy payments in the country and simulated two models based
on different assumptions regarding the parameter: (i) 𝜈=0.43,
corresponding to an economy with a subsidy regime, and (ii) 𝜈=1.0,
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corresponding to an economy without a fuel subsidy regime. Our results
show that oil price shocks have non-trivial implications for output, prices
and interest rate in our small open economy. While a negative oil price
shock leads to a contraction in aggregate GDP, the severity of the
contraction is amplified under the model with fuel subsidies. The paper,
however, notes that retaining the subsidy programme has some appeal in
terms of its ability to generate relative macroeconomic stability, compared
to the case under a no-subsidy regime.
Although the subsidy regime is useful for stabilising the domestic
economy, its effects on long run growth, agent’s welfare and
government’s fiscal operations require further investigation. The findings
of such investigation would provide useful insights relating to the fiscal
sustainability of the subsidy programme as well as how best the
government could proceed with future reforms. In view of the findings of
this study, we caution that a successful exit strategy must necessarily
accommodate the deployment of well-targeted safety nets as well as the
evolution of sustainable adjustment mechanisms.
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